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The Changing Structure of Political Cleavages in Western Society
Ronald Inglehart
I. Introduct ion.
The cleavage structures underlying politics in Western 
nations have changed profoundly during the past two decades. As 
a result, the textbook definitions of "Left" and "Right" (or in 
the American context, of "liberal" and "conservative") are only 
partly valid today.
Political cleavages can be viewed as relatively stable 
patterns of polarization, in which given groups support given 
policies or parties, while other groups support opposing policies 
or parties. For almost a generation, the nature of both the 
groups and the policy issues aligned with Left and Right have 
been changing.
In the classic model of industrial society, political 
polarization was a direct reflection of social class conflict.
The working class was considered the natural base of support for 
the Left— that is, of support for change in an egalitarian 
direction. And the key issue underlying the Left-Right 
polarization was conflict over ownership of the means of 
production and the distribution of income.
As industrializing society gives way to advanced industrial 
society, there is a growing tendency for politics to polarize 
along a new dimension that cuts across this conventional Left- 
Right axis. Increasingly, support for social change comes from a 





























































































group has raised a new set of issues that tend to dominate the 
contemporary political agenda.
Today many of the most controversial issues and the most 
important political movements polarize along a Materialist/Post- \
Materialist dimension. The environmentalist movement, the 
opposition to nuclear power, the peace movement, the women’s 
movement, the limits to growth movement, the consumer advocacy 
movement— all of these are manifestations of a political cleavage 
dimension that is only loosely related to conflict over ownership 
of the means of production and traditional social class conflict.
The fact that these movements have taken the center of the stage 
in contemporary politics reflects a long-term shift in the value 
priorities of Western publics (Inglehart, 1977, 1981).
Thus far, this new axis of polarization has had only a 
limited impact on voting behavior: long-established political
party loyalties, reinforced by party organizations and 
institutional linkages with labor unions and churches, are highly 
resistent to change. People continue to vote for the parties 
prevailing in their milieu, which their parents or even 
grandparents may have supported. To a considerable degree,
Lipset and Rokkan (1967) were correct in speaking of a "freezing 
of party alignments" dating back to the era when modern mass 
party systems were first established. But though deep-rooted 
political party alignments continue to shape voting behavior in 
many countries, they do not reflect the dynamics of the new -




























































































to active protest and support for change than the class-based 
axis that became institutionalized decades ago.
This disparity between traditional political party 
alignments and the dynamics of contemporary issue-polarization 
places existing party systems under chronic stress. For extended 
periods of time, the traditional party systems may appear to be 
in business as usual— until suddenly, a basic restructuring 
occurs. Sometimes the change manifests itself in the emergence 
of new political parties, as in The Netherlands or Italy. But 
the capture of long-established parties by new elites is a more 
promising avenue to success, for major political parties 
represent great psychological and institutional investments; 
established voting patterns are not lightly discarded. But this 
inertia means that party alignments can lag behind social change 
until the major ideological cleavage cut almost orthogonally 
across established party spaces. When this happens, the 
alternatives are Realignment or Dealignment: the parties must 
either reorient themselves or risk being split— or suffer a 
gradual erosion of partisan loyalties. In many western nations, 
from Great Britain and West Germany to the United States, that 
situation prevails today.
2. From Class-based to Value-based Political Polarization.
The idea that politics is a struggle between rich and poor 
can be traced back to Plato. But unquestionably the most 
influential modern version of this idea has been Karl Marx’s 
argument that throughout industrial society, social class 




























































































Marx's influence is reflected not only in a vast literature of 
social criticism, but also in the existence of an entire family 
of political parties that were inspired by his writings and, in 
varying degrees, purport to be guided by his analysis today.
The idea that politics in industrial societies is a class 
struggle has received strong support in the findings of empirical 
social research. Thus, in his classic and immensely influential 
work, Political Man, Lipset (I960: 223-224) concludes that "The 
most important single fact about political party support is that 
in virtually every economically developed country the lower 
income groups vote mainly for the parties of the Left, while the 
higher income groups vote mainly for the parties of the Right."
In another influential study based on data from four 
English-speaking democracies, Alford (1963) found that in 
virtually every available survey, manual workers were more likely 
to vote for parties of the Left than non-manual workers. 
Calculating a "class-voting index" (obtained by subtracting the 
percentage of non-manual respondents voting for the Left from the 
percentage of manual respondents voting for the Left) Alford 
found a mean index of +16 for the United States, and one of +40 
for Great Britain.
More recent empirical analyses have demonstrated that 
religion is also a major factor, but confirmed that social class 
is one of the most powerful bases of political cleavage, towering 
above other variables, when not dominated by ethnic cleavages 
such as religion, language or race (see for example, Rose and 




























































































Nevertheless, there were grounds for believing that a 
paramount role for social class voting was not an immutable fact 
of political life. Campbell et al (1960) argued that class 
voting in the United States, to a considerable extent, reflected 
a cohort effect: it was most pronounced among the generation
that came of age during the Great Depression, and weaker among 
both older and younger groups. They speculated that class voting 
may vary inversely with prosperity, with substantial time lags 
due to cohort effects. Inglehart (1971, 1977) carried this line 
of reasoning farther, presenting evidence of a pervasive 
intergenerational shift from Materialist to Post-Materialist 
value priorities among the publics of advanced industrial 
society. The Post-Materialist outlook is linked with having 
spent one's formative years in conditions of economical and 
physical security; hence it is far more prevalent among the 
postwar generation than among older cohorts, throughout Western 
Society; and tends to be concentrated among the more prosperous 
strata of any given age group.
The political implications are significant and at first seem 
paradoxical. Post-Materialists give top priority to such goals 
as a sense of community and the non-material quality of life, but 
they live in societies that have traditionally emphasized 
economic gains above all. Hence, though they tend to come from 
the most privileged and economically most favored strata of 
society, they tend to be relatively dissatisfied with the kind of 
society in which they live, and relatively favorable to social 




























































































traditionally supported the parties of the Right, they themselves 
tend to support the parties of the Left when they become 
politically engaged.
Conversely, when Post-Materialist issues (such as 
environmentalism, the women's movement, unilateral disarmament, 
opposition to nuclear power, etc.) become central, they may 
stimulate a Materialist reaction in which much of the working 
class sides with the Right, to reaffirm the traditional 
Materialist emphasis on economic growth, military security and 
domestic law and order.
The rise of Post-Materialist issues, therefore, tends to 
neutralize political polarization based on social class. Though 
long-established party loyalties and institutional ties link the 
working class to the Left and the middle class to the Right, the 
social basis of new support for the parties and policies of the 
Left tends to come disproportionally from middle class sources. 
But, at the same time, the Left parties become vulnerable to a 
potential split between their Post-Materialist Left, intensely 
engaged in new issues, and their traditional Materialist 
constituency.
In 1972, this phenomenon temporarily shattered the 
Democratic Party in the United States; in 1981, it contributed to 
a possibly more permanent division of the British Left, split 
between a Labour Party that had been captured by a neo-Marxist 
and neutralist Left wing, and a new Social Democric Party that at 
won over much of the party's mass constituency. Throughout the 




























































































the German Social Democratic Party, torn between a Post- 
Materialist "Young Socialist" wing, and the labor-oriented main 
body.
In multi-party systems with straight proportional 
representation, the viability of new parties is considerably 
greater than in the countries just discussed. Hence, in The 
Netherlands, Scandanavia and Italy this phenomenon has given rise 
to small but influential Post-Materialist parties (Lijphart, 
1981): Leftist in policy orientation, their social base is 
largely middle class.
After a lull in the middle 1970s, West European politics 
again show widespread political upheaval. And despite the 
economic difficulties of the present period, Post-Materialist 
issues continue to play a major role. When demonstrations take 
place, they are not directed against unemployment or declining 
real income— on the contrary, most of them are aimed at 
preventing the construction of nuclear power plants, highways, 
airports, military installations, hydroelectric dams and other 
projects that might reduce unemployment. Now, as earlier, labor 
is concerned with unemployment, wages, and inflation; but 
political activism continues to reflect mainly Post-Materialist 
concerns. Recent economic uncertainty seems to have slowed the 
growth of Post-Materialism in Western Europe but not stopped it: 
a Post-Materialist value type was more widespread at the end of 
the 1970s than at the start of that decade, and had shifted from 
being predominantly a student phenomenon, to being an important 




























































































Our hypotheses concerning the emergence of a Post- 
Materialist Left imply a long term decline in social class 
voting. Has it taken place?
Alford (1963: 226) examined this possibility himself, and 
concluded that "There had been no substantial shift in the class 
bases of American politics since the 1930's, despite the 
prosperity since World War II and despite the shifts to the Right 
during the Eisenhower era."
Alford seems to have been correct in his interpretation of 
the evidence he examined; indeed, social class voting in the 
United States actually rose during the period he dealt with, 
peaking about 1948 as the generation of the New Deal matured.
But more recent studies by Glenn (1973), Abramson (1975, 1978), 
Books and Reynolds (1975), Inglehart (1977), Baker, Dalton and 
Hildebrandt (1981) and Stephens (1981) support the conclusion 
that during the past few decades there has been a secular decline 
in social class voting, not only in the United States but 
throughout much of the Western world.
This tendency is probabilistic, not deterministic. A 
variety of factors affect the voters' choice— among them, long­
term party loyalties (sometimes transmitted from one generation 
to the next), religious and other group ties, the personalities 
of given candidates, the relative positions of the various 
parties on key issues, and the current economic situation. These 
factors can cause large fluctuations in class voting from one 
election to the next within a given nation, and help account for 




























































































body of evidence points to the conclusion that, underlying these 
fluctuations and cross national differences, a long term decline 
in class voting took place during the past 30 years. Thus, in 
the revised edition of Political Man Lipset (1981) updates his 
own earlier conclusions about social class voting with a new 
chapter containing the evidence shown in Figure 1. The 
fluctuations we see in Figure 1 are sometimes dramatic, but the 
downward trend is unmistakable and seems to have continued into 
the 1970's, despite the economic setbacks of that decade. As 
Figure 1 demonstrates, class voting in the United States fell 
almost to zero in 1972, when the McGovernites captured the 
Democratic Presidential nomination, mobilizing the Post- 
Materialist constituency very effectively, but also bringing a 
massive desertion of working class voters. Many of the latter 
returned to their traditional party allegiance, under a centrist 
candidate in 1976; but class voting in the United States remains 
low— and even this modest level largely reflects its persistence 
among older voters: among the youngest American age cohorts, it 
is close to zero (Abramson, 1978). West European data show a 
similar pattern: for the European Community as a whole during
1976-1979, the class-voting index for those more than 54 years 
old was +24; for those aged 18-34, it was only +15.
(Figure 1 about here)
Class voting seems to have declined. But in order to grasp 
the implications of this phenomenon, we need to know why it has 
taken place. Does it reflect an intergenerational value change 



























































































ALFORD INDEX OF CLASS VOTING
Figure 1. The Trend in Class Voting in Four Western Democracies, 
1948-1980.
From: Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (second edition)




























































































it will tend to continue, as younger, relatively Post-Materialist 
age groups replace the oldest, most Materialist-oriented age 
cohorts in the electorate. Or is the phenomenon a direct 
reflection of current economic conditions— in which case we would 
expect a reversal of the downward trend in the present era, and a 
possible return to the politics of social class conflict that 
characterized the 1930's and 1940’s? Or does the pattern in 
Figure 1 simply reflect the personalities and strategies of the 
political parties in these four countries during this particular 
period— a pattern that would be dispelled by evidence from a 
broader range of countries or from a longer series of time 
points?
These are part of a series of questions that will be 
addressed in this article. For the decline of social class 
voting is only one aspect of a broader transformation of 
political polarization. And in some ways, class voting patterns 
give an understated impression of what has been going on. For 
voting behavior is shaped, to a considerable extent, by an 
internalized sense of political party identification in given 
individuals, and by institutional ties between given parties and 
given social networks, such as labor union or church. In so far 
as this is true, voting behavior has a good deal of inertia; it 
does not necessarily respond to current conditions, but may 
continue to reflect old alignments long after the circumstances 
that gave rise to them have changed. Other indicators of 




























































































For example, one of the standard questions in the Euro- 
Barometer surveys sponsored by the European Communities, asks 
whether the respondent favors revolutionary political change, 
gradual reform, or defense of the established order. One can use 
responses to this item to measure social class polarization, by 
examing the differences between the responses of those with 
manual and non-manual occupations.
Because this item does not require the respondent to 
indicate a political party preference, it is less contaminated by 
the effects of political party loyalties than is the Alford 
Index— and should reflect the decline (or rise) of social class 
polarization even more sharply and more immediately than does the 
latter. But if our supposition is true that this indicator 
reflects current influences more than party identification does, 
in the event of sharply rising social class conflict, it would 
show more class polarization than the Alford index.
We will also use the respondent's self-placement on a Left- 
Right ideological scale as an indicator of political 
polarization. Previous research has demonstrated that this 
measure reflects a partisanship component, as well as an 
ideological component (Inglehart and Klingemann, 1976). Some 
respondents place themselves at a given point on this scale 
because that is where the party they support is conventionally 
located; placing oneself on the Left (or the center, or Right) is 
more or less a surrogate for party identification. For these 
people, Left-Right self-placement would have much the same 




























































































For many respondents, however, this scale taps one's overall 
ideological position: it seems to be a summary measure of one's
stand on the most important current political issues, analogous 
to the first factor in a principal components factor analysis. 
Insofar as this is true, our hypotheses imply that the political 
meaning of Left and Right (or of liberal and conservative, in the 
American sense) has been changing. With the rise of new issues, 
identification with the "Left" increasingly would come to connote 
support for new causes such as environmentalism, with a 
diminishing tendency to evoke the classic issues such as 
nationalization of industry. Similarly, self-placement on the 
Left would have a declining linkage with working-class status.
To some observers, this prospect seems almost inconceivable. 
Commenting on a surprisingly weak observed correlation between 
Left-Right self placement and social class, Budge, Crewe and 
Farlie (1976:135) argue that "In our opinion the absence of a 
class influence on the Left-Right continuum is somewhat 
surprising and must raise doubts about its validity. For if the 
working class are not substantially located to the Left and the 
middle class to the Right, what meaning does the continuum have?"
If we define the Left as that portion of the spectrum 
supported by the working class, then this finding does, of 
course, invalidate Left-Right self-placement. But this is a 
circular and rather fruitless definition of the Left-Right 
dimension. If, as we argue, this dimension is a summary measure 
of one's overall ideological position— based on the issues that 




























































































the Left or Right and any given social group is 
question, and one that is subject to change ove 
present evidence that the Left-Right ideologica 
in fact, tend to assimilate whatever issues are 
that among mass publics, its meaning has, to a 
degree, already shifted to reflect the new poli 
The hypotheses underlying this article can 
follows :
an empirical 
r time. We will 
1 dimension does, 




Hypothesis 1: A new issues dimension has attained salience,
along with the economic issues dimension that conventionally 
has been considered the basis of political polarization.
This dimension has arisen recently enough so that it has not 
yet been assimilated into a generally accepted Left-Right 
dimension. By contrast, the clerical/anti-clerical split, 
long viewed as an independent cleavage, cutting orthogonally 
across the class-based Left-Right dimension in such 
countries as France and Italy, has now become largely 
assimilated to a conventional Left-Right partisanship 
dimension in these countries. In the long run, something 
like this will probably happen to the new non-economic 
issues dimension, but for the time being it retains a 
relatively large degree of autonomy. Because the issues 
linked with this dimension have not yet been resolved or 
institutionalized, they constitute a more potent source of 
discontent and support for change than does the conventional 
Left-Right dimension.
Hypothesis 2: Closely linked with the rise of a new issues
dimension has been the rise of a new axis of group 
polarization, along side the familiar working class-middle 
class polarization (which has largely absorbed the clerical/ 
anti-clerical split, in the relevant countries). The 
growing saliency of both the new issues dimension, and this 
new axis of group polarization, reflects a shift in the 
priorities of Western peoples.
The sources of these structural changes can be traced on two
levels: at the individual level, the emergence of
active and articulate Post-Materialist minority in 
































































































importance on the social and esthetic quality of life than on 
economic and physical security, the Post-Materialists have 
emphasized new issues (such as environmentalism) or brought a new 
perspective to ageless ones (such as military expenditures). Not 
only are the Post-Materialists themselves more apt to respond to 
these issues than to the classic labor versus management issues; 
but by bringing them to the center of the stage, they have 
sometimes engendered a Materialist reaction that mobilizes 
segments of the working class, as well as the traditional middle- 
class, in defense of Materialist values— and in opposition to 
proposed social change. Though a minority, the Post-Materialists 
now tend to control the issue agenda; and their impact tends to 
reshape patterns of group polarization.
At the societal level, these shifts can be viewed as a 
logical response to changing circumstances. Economic issues are 
less urgent at a high level of economic development then at a low 
one: economic growth is almost necessarily given top priority by 
poor societies, once it is realized that it is possible, and can 
bring an end to starvation. But at a high level of development, 
economic growth may no longer be a means to avoid hunger, but a 
means to provide the average family with a second car— a goal 
that not only has less urgency, but may introduce elements of 
noise, pollution and crowding that can become counterproductive 
to the maximization of human utilities.
At both individual and societal levels, there tend to be 
significant time lags between economic change and its political 




























































































number of years after the various postwar economic miracles. At 
the individual level, political change is linked with the process 
of intergenerational population replacement: Post-Materialism
began to have a major impact only when the Post-War generation 
reached politically-relevant age in the late 1960s. At the 
societal level, political change theoretically could take place 
rather quickly— except that it tends to be retarded by social 
networks and institutional ties that can be highly resistant to 
change.
These are the central hypotheses that concern us here. A 
secondary group of hypotheses can be derived from them, which we 
will sketch forth briefly:
Hypothesis 3: Social class voting varies inversely with
prosperity within a given nation.
This hypothesis follows directly from our theory of value 
change; but it could also be stated in more general terms: when
economic issues are most salient, the publics of industrialized 
societies tend to polarize according to social class; when non­
economic issues become central, political polarization takes 
place across class lines.
Hypothesis 3.1: Overall, there has been a substantial
decline in social class voting in Western nations during 
the period since World War II.
This hypothesis simply reflects the fact that there were 
sizeable increases in real income per capita, and in the standard 
of living, in all of these societies during this period. The 
trend is not irreversible, however: if an economic crisis 
comparable to the Great Depression occurred during the 1930's, we 




























































































Hypothesis 4: Class voting varies inversely with
polarization according to Materialist/Post-Materialist 
values.
A major reason for the decline in class voting has been the 
emergence, within the past two decades, of a significant and 
influential Post-Materialist minority. Within any given nation 
Post-Materialists are significantly less likely to vote along 
class lines than are Materialists; moreover, a Materialist 
reaction is most likely to occur where Post-Materialism is 
relatively salient.
Hypothesis 5: Religious voting is not directly undermined
by the rise of Post-Materialist issues.
Unlike class voting, the correlation between religiosity and
support for the Left is undisturbed when Post-materialist issues
become central: Post-Materialists have low rates of church
attendance— and both of these characteristics are linked with
support for the Left. This fact may have contributed to the
remarkable persistence of religious voting in many countries— a
persistence that is surprising if one's expectations are shaped
by economic determinism. Religious voting may eventually
decline, if there is declining interest in religion itself— but
unlike class voting, it is not inherently dissonant with the rise
of Post-Materialist issues. Quite the contrary, polarization
over these issues can give religious voting a new lease on life.
Hypothesis 6: Social class voting tends to remain
relatively strong where political party identification is 
strong.
Political party identification tends to resist changes in 
established political patterns, influencing an individual to 




























































































whatever party his parents supported. Hence, if social class
voting was strong in the past and has been weakened by relatively
recent factors, it will be preserved most strongly among those
groups and nations that are characterized by relatively strong
loyalties to established parties.
Hypothesis 6.1: But in the long run, political party
identification itself tends to be eroded gradually, by the 
rise of new cleavages that are dissonant with existing 
alignments (Inglehart and Hochstein, 1972).
Hypothesis 7: The impact of Post-Materialism will be
greatest on those forms of political polarization that are 
least strongly linked with established party loyalties. 
Conversely, class cleavages will retain their greatest 
strength among those forms of polarization most closely 
linked with political party loyalties.
Political party identification itself is reshaped only 
gradually by the rise of new values; hence it helps to preserve 
old patterns among those variables highly correlated with it. 
Where voting behavior is closely related to political party 
loyalties, it will polarize according to individual values only 
slightly more than party identification itself. Left-Right self­
placement tends to reflect political party ties in part, but it 
also reflects one's reaction to current issues. Hence, it is 
more likely to polarize according to one's values. Finally, 
support for social change is not necessarily tied to political 
party loyalties at all. Hence, polarization over this basic 
super-issue will reflect individual value priorities above all; 
being only minimally constrained by party ties, it will show a 
minimum level of social class polarization, under current 
conditions.
Hypothesis 8: Class voting will be strongest among the




























































































younger cohorts. This will also hold true for other forms
of political polarization.
If our assumption is correct that class voting was 
relatively strong in the past, but is declining due to 
intergenerational population replacement, given age cohorts will 
show contrasting characteristics, reflecting the circumstances 
that prevailed during their formative years.
3. Two Faces of Left and Right.
Our first hypothesis is that a new dimension of political 
polarization has become salient, reflecting a polarization 
between Materialist and Post-Materialist issue preferences. In 
order to test this hypothesis, let us examine the dimensionality 
of a battery of 13 items included in surveys carried out in all 
nine nations belonging to the European Community in Spring, 1979. 
Surveys were conducted simultaneously with: (1) representative 
national samples of the publics of each nation (as part of the 
Euro-Barometer surveys) and (2) a sample of 742 candidates 
running for seats in the European Parliament. The latter sample 
should give a reasonably good indication of the issue preferences 
of West European political elites. It includes politicians 
belonging to all of the important political parties in all nine 
nations. In social background, these respondents resemble the 
members of the respective national parliaments (in which many of 
them hold seats). Our battery of questions was designed to 
measure preferences on a wide range of issues: not only those
that have become salient in recent years (such as nuclear power, 




























































































nationalization of industry, redistribution of income and the 
government role in the economy.
This battery was worded as follows:
We'd like to hear your views on some important political 
issues. Could you tell me whether you agree or disagree 
with each of the following proposals? How strongly do you 
feel? (Show CARD)
1. Stronger public control should be exercised over the 
activities of multinational corporations.
2. Nuclear energy should be developed to meet future energy 
needs.
3. Greater effort should be made to reduce inequality of 
income.
4. More severe penalties should be introduced for acts of 
terrorism.
5. Public ownership of private industry should be expanded.
6. Government should play a greater role in the management 
of the economy.
7. Western Europe should make a stronger effort to provide 
adequate military defence.
8. Women should be free to decide for themselves in matters 
concerning abortion.
9. Employees should be given equal representation with 
share holders on the governing boards of large companies.
10. Economic aid to Third World countries should be 
increased.
11. Stronger measures should be taken to protect the 
environment against pollution.
12. Stronger measures should be taken to protect the Rights 
of individuals to express their own political views.
13. Economic aid to the less developed regions of the 
European Community should be increased.
The respondent was shown a card, offering the following
categories for response to each item: "Agree Strongly," "Agree,"
"Disagree," and "Disagree Strongly."
Table 1 shows the results of a factor analysis with varimax
rotation, based on responses to this battery of items, among
candidates for the European Parliament. For reasons of space,
only the results from a pooled sample of 742 candidates from all
nine nations are shown here; separate nation-by-nation analyses




























































































(Table 1 about here)
The expected pattern emerges, with striking clarity. Our 
first factor is based on six items designed to tap the Classic 
economic concerns; the most sensitive indicators of this 
dimension are one's attitude toward government management and 
ownership of the economy. The second factor shows a quite 
distinct content; its four highest-loading items are those 
designed to tap the new politics. Nuclear energy and abortion 
are new issues— they literally did not exist as political issues 
a generation ago; terrorism has a long history, but its present 
form is new. Defense, obviously, is not a new issue— quite the 
contrary, it, is probably the oldest concern of the state. But 
domestic opposition to one's own defense establishment took on 
new overtones during the conflict in Vietnam, when opposition to 
the war came to be motivated much less by traditional 
conservative reasons (above all, opposition to heavy government 
expenditures and higher taxes), than by a Post-Materialist 
concern for the impact of the war on the purported enemy. Though 
the issue is ancient, both the motivations and social bases that 
underlie it have changed. A fifth item— concerning public 
ownership of industry— clearly does not fit our expectations; but 
it is by far the weakest-loading item. Its presence here signals 
the fact that this question plays a highly salient and pivotal 
role in the ideological structure of professional politicians—  
something that is not equally true of mass publics. As we will 
shortly demonstrate (see Table 3 below), the issue preferences of 




























































































ISSUE POSITIONS OF CANDIDATES TO EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT: 
FACTOR ANALYSIS WITH VARIMAX ROTATION
(All loadings above .300 are shown)
I. Economic Left-Right 
(37%)
II. Non-Economic Left- 
(14%)
Right
More government management Stronger measures against
of economy .764 terrorism .776
More public ownership of Develop nuclear energy .733
industry .708 Stronger defense effort .727
Reduce income inequality .642 Women free to choose
Public control of abortion -.574
multinat ionals .633 More public ownership
Equal representation for 
employees




Source: Survey of Candidates for European Parliament conducted in Spring, 1979.
For sampling details see Inglehart, Rabier, Gordon and Sorenson, "Broader Powers 
for the European Parliament? The Attitudes of Candidates," European Journal of 




























































































similar analysis also reveals two dimensions, based on almost 
exactly the same items as those in Table 1— except that "public 
ownership of industry" does not load on the second factor.
We hypothesize that the second dimension reflects a 
Materialist/Post-Materialist polarization, rather than 
traditional social class conflict. Whether or not this is the 
case remains to be demonstrated.. First, we must clear up some 
questions, concerning the degree to which we actually have two 
distinct dimensions.
Varimax rotation can identify two or more independent 
components of an attitudinal structure even if the variables are 
only relatively distinct. And among the elites, these two 
dimensions are only relatively distinct. The mean correlation 
among the three highest-loading items on the first dimension is 
.50; the mean correlation among the three highest-loading items 
on the second dimension is .45; the mean correlation between the 
two sets of items is -.33. In other words, at the elite level we 
find two distinguishable issue clusters, but they are by no means 
unrelated. In a principal components analysis, ail of these 
items show substantial loadings on what could be interpreted as 
an overarching Left-Right ideological dimension, or super-issue.
Nevertheless, it is meaningful to distinguish between these 
two issue clusters. Indeed, unless we do so, we lose sight of a 
major shift in the meaning and social bases of Left and Right. 
Moreover, though they tend to be integrated into an overarching 
Left-Right structure at the elite level, among the general public 




























































































almost totally unrelated in an absolute sense. To be specific: 
the mean correlation among the three items concerning public 
ownership, public management, and income inequality, is .28; the 
mean correlation among the items concerning terrorism, nuclear 
energy and defense is .23; but the mean correlation between the 
two sets of items is -.05: at the public level, we are dealing 
with two completely independent dimensions. In part, this 
finding reflects a pervasive tendency for mass publics to show 
less constraint than elites. But it is also true (as we will see 
below) that the two issue clusters are fundamentally different in 
nature and antecedents.
The fact that the two issue dimensions are distinct and 
relatively independent does not mean that they are unrelated to a 
broader Left-Right orientation, even among mass publics. For 
politics frequently demands a dichotomous choice: a politician
must join or oppose a given coalition; or a voter one must choose 
between Giscard and Mitterrand. The effort to build a winning 
coalition provides a powerful incentive to depict politics in 
bipolar terms that dichotomize between the good guys and the bad 
guys. The Left-Right image is an oversimplication, but an almost 
inevitable one that in the long run tends to assimilate all 
important issues.
We suggested above that the Left-Right dimension, as a 
political concept, is a higher-level abstraction used to 
summarize one's stand on the important political issues of the 
day. It serves the function of organizing and simplifying a 




























































































toward a potentially limitless number of issues, political 
parties and social groups. The pervasive use of the Left-Right 
concept through the years in Western political discourse 
testifies to its usefulness. Insofar as political reality can be 
reduced to one underlying dimension, then one can readily 
distinguish between friend and foe, and between the good and bad 
positions on given issues, in terms of relative distances from 
one’s own position on this dimension. To be sure, social 
conflict is rarely if ever unidimensional. Thus, to speak in 
terms of Left and Right is always an oversimplication— but an 
extremely useful one. In order to individually describe the 
relationships between a mere dozen issues or parties, one would 
need to make sixty-six pairwise comparisons; fourteen issues or 
parties would require ninety-one comparisons. This degree of 
cognitive complexity is hopelessly unmanageable in practical 
politics. Ideologues and politicians almost inevitably tend to 
sum up the alternatives in terms of such all-embracing concepts 
as "Left" and "Right" that provide a relatively simple guideline 
for forming alliances or appealing for mass support. The core 
meaning of the Left-Right dimension, we believe, is whether one 
supports or opposes social change in an egalitarian direction: 
typically, the Left (or, in America, the liberal side) supports 
change, while the Right opposes it (see Lipset et al. [1954]). It 
is important to specify the direction of desired change: while 
conservative movements may be content to defend the status quo, 
reactionary ones may seek change in the direction of greater 




























































































The utility of the Left-Right concept rests on the fact 
that, through the years and from one setting to another, the 
basic political conflicts quite often do reflect a polarization 
between those seeking social change and those opposing it. The 
concept is sufficiently general that as new issues arise, they 
usually can be fitted into the framework: the specific kinds of
change may change, but the question of more or less equality is 
usually involved, whether it be between social classes, 
nationalities, races or sexes. Moreover, there is some 
continuity in which groups seek change: generally, those who are 
least favorably situated in a given social order are most likely 
to support change. Hence over the years, certain social groups 
and political parties may come to be identified with either the
"Left" or the "Right." ________
Representative national samples of the publics of the nine 
European Communities countries have repeatedly been asked, "In 
political matters people talk of 'the Left' and 'the Right.' How 
would you place your views on this scale?" When shown a scale 
with ten boxes ranging from "Left" to "Right," the overwhelming 
majority of respondents place themselves at some point on the 
scale, with little hesitation. These responses generally bear a 
coherent relationship to the respondents' other views. For 
example, in keeping with our concept of the core meaning of Left 
and Right, those who are most supportive of social change are 





























































































A subjective sense of identification with the Left or the 
Right (or the Center) is widespread in Western Europe— but just 
what does it mean? It could, conceivably, be something similar 
to political party identification. In given countries, there is 
a consensus that given political parties are located at either 
the Left or.the Right (or extreme Left, center or extreme Right). 
Originally, such images may have been based on the party’s stand 
on salient issues, but over time they might well become 
stereotypes that do not necessarily bear much relationship to 
current issues. How widespread is this phenomenon?
A cross-national survey conducted in Britain, Germany, The 
Netherlands, Austria and the United States in 1974 asked the 
question about Left-Right self-placement cited above, and then 
followed it up with the open-ended question: "What does 'Left; 
mean to you?" . . . "What does 'Right' mean to you?" (for 
sampling information, see Barnes, Kaase et al., 1979). In the 
four European countries, from one-fifth to one-half of the 
respective samples defined "Left" by referring to specific 
political parties; a slightly larger proportion defined "Right" 
in the same way. Only about one percent of the American public 
responded with party labels: the terms Left and Right have come 
into widespread use only recently in the United States, and have 
not become generally accepted stereotypes for American political 
parties; but this does seem to be the case, to a considerable 
extent, in Western Europe.
One component of the meaning of the Left-Right dimension, 




























































































linked with specific points on the continuum. This miqht reflect 
an accurate summary of each party's current position on key 
issues— but it could also be a stereotype that persists long 
after the events that gave a given party a given image.
It is clear, however, that (for a substantial share of the 
public, at least) the terms Left and Right have a meaning that 
goes beyond outdated stereotypes. In the 1974 surveys, in each 
country except Britain about half of the sample defined "Left" in 
terms of some ideology or with reference to more or less 
government, or to social or political change; and about 40 
percent defined "Right" in similar broad, abstract terms.
But what is the current meaning of Left and Right in terms 
of specific issues? In order to answer this, let us examine the 
correlations between Left-Right self-placement, and the battery 
of items designed to measure preferences on both the classic 
economic issues, and some newer issues. To what extent have the 
new issues become assimilated to the Left-Right dimension? To 
what extent do the new and old issues give rise to separate axes 
of polarization?
Table 2 provides an answer to the first question. One's 
stand on the traditional economic issues show substantial 
correlations with Left-Right self-placement in every case; for 
example, those who were most supportive of greater efforts to 
reduce income inequality showed a marked tendency to place 




























































































(Table 2 about here)
But by 1979, the new issues were also integrated with the 
Left-Right orientation of both elites and mass publics to a truly 
impressive degree.
The general pattern is similar among both elites and 
publics; at both levels, the items that correlate most strongly 
with Left-Right self-placement are the top-loading items on the 
economic Left-Right dimension, and the non-economic Left-Right 
dimension respectively. In other words, our strongest indicators 
of both dimensions seem to have the greatest impact on whether an 
individual views himself as located on the Left or the Right.
But there are significant differences between elites and 
general publics. For one, these correlations are consistently 
stronger at the elite level than at the mass public level. On 
the average, we can explain four times as much variance in Left- 
Right self-placement at the elite level as at the mass level.
This seems to provide unambiguous support for Converse's side of 
the long-standing debate on the Nature of Belief Systems Among 
Mass Publics (Converse, 1964, 1970, 1974; cf. Pierce and Rose, 
1974). Constraint is much greater at the elite level, and since 
virtually identical questions were asked of both elites and 
general publics, the relatively low level of constraint among 
mass publics must be due to relatively low levels of political 
interest or other characteristics of the publics themselves, 





























































































CORRELATION BETWEEN LEFT-RIGHT SELF-PLACEMENT AND POSITION 
ON SPECIFIC ISSUES AMONG WESTERN ELITES AND PUBLICS, 1979 
(Pearson product-moment correlations)*
1. Among Candidates for European
Parliament__________________
Issue r=
More public ownership of
industry .617
More gov't. management of
economy .599
Stronger defense effort -.553
More control over multi­
nationals .519
Reduce income equality .502
Women should be free to
choose abortion .474




Develop nuclear energy -.454






More aid to poorer regions
of Europe .183
2. Among Publics of Nine E.C. Nations
Issue r=
Stronger defense effort -.355
Employees equal rep. on boards .277
Reduce income inequality .271
More public ownership of
industry .235
Women should be free to choose
abortion .200
Develop nuclear energy -.200
Mope severe anti-terrorist
measures -.198
More gov't, management of
economy .198
More control over multi­
nationals .197
Protect freedom of expression .191 
More aid to poorer regions of
Europe .176




* Positive polarity indicates that those who support a given issue tend to 
place themselves on the Left. Based on pooled data from candidates from 
all nine nations, and publics from all nine nations, weighted according 
to population and (with the candidate data) according to party strength 




























































































Of more immediate interest, however, is the fact that the 
economic issues are more closely linked with the elite concept of 
Left-Right self-placement than are the non-economic issues.
Among the general publics, however, the non-economic issues 
figure somewhat more prominently; indeed, the strongest predictor 
of mass Left-Right self-placement— by a wide margin— is one's 
attitude toward national defense.
The classic issues of government ownership and management of 
industry continue to define the terms "Left" and "Right" among 
political elites. These are the textbook examples of Left-Right 
issues, the stereotypes that figured prominently in the rhetoric 
and literature with which the elites were socialized. But the 
mass public has not read the classic literature. These issues do 
not have the same resonance among mass publics as among elites; 
for the public, the connotations of Left and Right seem to be 
more influenced by current events than is true of the elites. 
Thus, when we perform a factor analysis of issue orientations 
among the public, the same two dimensions emerge as among 
elites— but Left-Right self-placement tends to load on the new 
politics dimension, rather than on the economic issues factor, as 
Table 3 demonstrates. Among the general public the issue that 
showed the strongest correlation with Left-Right self-placement, 
was support or opposition to a stronger military defense effort. 
One would not expect this a priori.
(Table 3 about here)
At various times in the past, the relationship between Left 




























































































ISSUE PREFERENCES AND LEFT-RIGHT SELF-PLACEMENT OF WESTERN PUBLICS: 
FACTOR ANALYSIS WITH VARIMAX ROTATION
(All loadings above .250 are shown)
I. Economic Left-Right II. Non-economic Left--Right
More economic aid to less
developed regions .615
Larger government role Stronger military
in managing economy .583 defense effort .694
Equal representation for More severe penalties
employees and owners for terrorism .529
on boards .576 Nuclear energy should
Greater effort to reduce be developed .516
income inequality .559 Women should be free
Stronger effort to protect to decide about
free expression .565 abortion -.346
More economic aid to Equal representation
Third World countries .553 for employees and
More public ownership owners on boards -.300
of industry .514 Self-placement on






Source: Pooled data from Surveys of Publics of Nine E.C. nations carried out
in April, 1979 (Euro-Barometer 11) sponsored by Commission of EC (N=8976).




























































































fluctuated and even reversed polarity. In the early phase of 
World War II, for example, Western communist parties opposed 
taking any part in the war, which was held to be a struggle of 
the ruling classes; after the invasion of the Soviet Union, 
partisans of the extreme Left reversed their position and became 
some of the most ardent advocates of an all-out effort against 
Hitler. In the United States, before Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt and 
other liberals struggled desperately to build up the military 
preparedness of the United States and the West, against 
opposition that was particularly strong in conservative circles. 
Though the Japanese attack brought virtually unanimous support 
for the war effort, there was a reprise of the earlier situation 
after the war: conservative Republicans, championed by Robert
Taft, advocated reduced defense expenditures and a withdrawal to 
Fortress America, while liberals supported a strong stand in the 
Cold War. This pattern seems to have persisted in the United 
States as recently as 1960, when Kennedy won victory over Nixon 
with a campaign that promised to close the "Missile Gap" and take 
a strong stand against Chinese threats to seize the islands of 
Quemoy and Matsu. Accordingly, in his analyses of the issue 
positions taken by Western political parties from 1957 to 1962, 
Janda's expectation was that the parties of the Left would be 
relatively favorable to higher allocations to the military. He 
found that support for higher military allocations turned out to 
be linked with the Right rather than the Left, in the West as a 
whole, but the association was very modest (Janda, 1970). It was 




























































































reversal of the earlier relationship. Opposition to the war 
became a major Post-Materialist cause, linked with humanitarian 
(rather than economic) concerns, and with opposition to the 
hierarchical authority patterns of industrial society. By the 
end of the 1970s, the military defense issue was— by a clear 
margin--the strongest correlate of Left-Right self-placement 
among Western publics. And such new issues as abortion, nuclear 
power and measures against terrorism showed correlations with 
Left-Right self-placement that were as high as, or higher than, 
those of a classic welfare state issue— the government role in 
the economy.
The absorptive power of the Left-Right concept is all the 
more impressive in view of the fact that attitudes toward nuclear 
power and terrorism showed quite weak correlations with Left- 
Right self-placement among older respondents; nevertheless, the 
relatively strong correlations among the young brought the 
overall figures up to the levels shown in Table 2. To be 
specific; among respondents aged 55 and over, the correlation 
between Left-Right self-placement, and attitudes toward nuclear 
power and terrorism (respectively) were: .118 and .090. Among 
those aged 15-34, the figures were .246 and .265. It seems that 
the linkage between these issues and mass Left-Right orientations 
is recent, and so far has fully penetrated only the younger 
groups. For the classic economic issues, on the other hand, age 
makes no difference: the old show correlations between Left-Right 
self-placement and economic issues that are as strong as, or 




























































































The relationship between issue positions and Left-Right 
self-placement among mass publics tends to be slightly 
curvilinear, which reduces the strength of the correlations in 
Table 2. Figures 2 and 3 show the mean levels of support for 
seven k e y issues, among respondents placing themselves at each of 
the ten points on our Left-Right ideological scale. Again, to 
economize space we pool the data from all nine European Community 
nations surveyed in 1979. Though interesting cross-national 
differences exist, the figures give a good idea of the general 
pattern. On these graphs, a mean score of 2.5 is the neutral 
point: a group with that score is evenly divided between support
and opposition to the given proposal. A mean score of 3.0 could 
be obtained if 100 per cent of the people in a given group were 
"for" the measure; or if 50 per cent were "strongly for" and 50 
per cent were "against;" or by various other combinations. A 
mean score of 3.5 could be obtained if 50 per cent of the 
respondents were "strongly for" the measure, the remaining 50 per 
cent were "for" it and no one were "against" or "strongly 
against" it: this reflects a very high level of support. A
score of 4.0 could be obtained only if everyone in a given group 
were "strongly for" that particular measure: with at least 
several hundred thousands of respondents located at each of the 
ten points on our Left-Right scale, we never obtain such extreme 
scores.
(Figures 2 and 3 about here)
The curvilinearity we observe results mainly from the fact 


























































































































Figure 2. Issue Positions and Left-Right Self-Placement 




























































































bold the most c \J i ; • a ' I V — l j.V (- ■. ' •= : 3 + ; •v_. fi r . *'■* 0 v ' ’ Va- •• C '! ' c
pm. t tern is quit e consi st t n t . It is most i 1 ‘ 1,1 T.C i: Ò in tonne
with atti tuces t o a r d • /t ‘ ' ' 1 ’ ;ng covernme !'it 1 >, O'.' 1 a t i On of v.he
. eonomy- •••vhe r e those pia c i r. g t hemse1ves ,-t -che e >; t r eme Right
(code 10 on our scale ) , t a k e an issue po siti on fV • k is more
"Leftist" than p 11 but the two extreme Left categories (cw’es 1 
end 2 cn the scale). This pattern (shown in Figure 2) reflects 
the fact that the people located at both extrct.es of the scale 
tend to be dissatisfied with the way society and politics are 
functioning and feel that radical changes are needed--and are 
likely to see the government as the only possible instrument to 
achieve these changes. One implication is that, under extreme 
conditions, both the extreme Left end the extreme Eight have a 
relatively high potential for Totalitarianism. Needless to say, 
government regulation is not totalitarian per se--but it may 
become so when carried to the point where government controls 
pervade every aspect of one's life. The two extremes of the 
political spectrum are relatively favorable to drastic change, 
er,c therefore to state intervention.
Curvilinearity is less extreme in connection with other :
disappears almost completely in attitudes toward environmental 
protection. But the absence of curvi]ir,errity in this case, is 
linked with the fact that there is very little variation in 
attitudes toward protecting the environment: practically
everyone is for it. Thus, despite the absence of curvilinearity 
it shows a very weak relationship with Left-Right self“placement 
i’hen this issue is reformulated to focus on the trade-off 
environmental protection and economic growth, we do obtain 
substantial variance---and then ve do find a relatively strong 






























































































Issue Positions and Left-Right Self-Placement 




























































































This curvi 1 ine"r relationship between Left-Right self-
placement and support for cov('rr.rnent control of the ec oncm y i s
not a transient fluke • U p, » i ji- finding is replicated i n the N ov e rr.be r ,
IS81 Euro-Be remoter su r v i. ys. Here, again, only the two groups at
the extreme Left (codes 1 end 2) are nore favorable to increased 
government management of the economy then those who place
themselves on the extreme Right (code 10). Attitudes toward 
public ownership also show a curvilinear tendency, though to a 
lesser degree; the extreme Right resembles those at the middle of 
the Left-Right continuum on this issue.
This curvilinear pattern characterizes our samples from 
Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, The Netherlands, end 
Ireland, when they are analyzed separately. It does not apply to 
Denmark on Greece: in these two countries, the extreme Right docs
take the extreme position
I n 11 r «?stingly n c u g h , the 
extremes on the <•*«. vel opr.v-
on the classic economic issues, 
two deviant casts fall at opposite 
tal spectrum; Greece is by far the
poorest country among the nine, and Denmark the richest.
Curvi 1 in-; a.rity in which the extreme Right turns back toward
the Leftist position, is visible in connection with both of the 
other two economic issues; but it is a particularly strong 
feature of attitudes toward public ownership of industry (where




























































































X. ft); and relatively v, .-k in t onr.w* t i on with attitudes t cv.-.: c a 
• •-•re p-a 1 d i st r ibut • cn of interne. We suggested above that 
■ /ppert for change in an egalitarian direction was the core 
■.c?ning of the Left-Right super-issue. If this is true, it seems 
- ppropi iate that attitudes toward reducing inequality of income, 
have the strongest correlation with Left-Right self-placement of 
ell the classic economic issues.
A curvilinear tendency on the extreme Right also exists 
among the three issues depicted in Figure 3, though it is of 
negligible size in connection with attitudes toward terrorism.
In the latter case, we (2 ga i n have a ;proposal that i s ba c k e
cverv 1;.e 1 r.ing majority of l b e publi c : all segments of the L
Right spectrum favor more severe penalties for acts of terrorism. 
There is a modest but perceptible curvilinearity at the extreme 
Right in attitudes toward military defense and toward developing 
nuclear energy, but the phenomena is .less pronounced here than in 
connection with the classic economic issues.
Though the most sensitive indicators of both the cld and new 
issue dimensions shew strong linkages with Left-Right self- 
placement, the position of the extreme Right on these issues is
c.;jciiis. 1 Dus • Those who sc e ther.. selves at the extreme Right
hold views at the oppos ite ex.trerne from the views of the
Left--in some ways their views are relatively close. In part, 
Right extremism lies in the fact that its partisans feel extreme
changes are needed—  their position is not just a further




























































































Turning to cross-national comparisons, the evidence suggests 
that at high levels of economic development, public support for 
the classic economic policies of the Left tends to diminish. As 
Table 3A demonstrates, Greece is by far the poorest country among 
the ten European Community countries surveyed in 1981; and the 
Greek public has— by far— the highest level of support for both 
nationalization of industry and government management of the 
economy. At the opposite end of the developmental spectrum, 
Denmark is the richest of the nine countries, and the Danish 
public has the lowest level of support for these policies.
(Table 3A about here)
By purely economic criteria, France should rank fifth, but 
she actually ranks third in support for these policies— a fact 
that may be related to the-remarkable electoral victories the 
French Left won in 1981. But this is the only anomaly: in all
other respects there is a perfect fit between economic 
developmental level and support for the classic economic policies 
of the Left.
These findings are consistent with in our theoretical 
framework: the principle of diminishing marginal utility seems to 
apply at the national level as well as the individual level. 
Greece is an economically underdeveloped country, with extreme 
contrasts between rich and poor. In such a context, it seems 
likely that the balance between rich and poor can be redressed 
only by strong government intervention. Denmark, on the other 
hand, is a relatively rich country that has long since developed 




























































































ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND SUPPORT FOR THE CLASSIC ECONOMIC POLICIES 
OF THE LEFT AMONG PUBLICS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY COUNTRIES (NOV., 1981)
Rank, in













1. Greece 1.60 1.25 1.43 $ 3,890
2. Ireland 2.27 1.85 2.06 4,230
3. France 2.58 1.95 2.27 10,030
4. Italy 2.95 1.85 2.40 5,240
5. United Kingdom 2.57 2.25 2.41 6,331
6. Netherlands 2.94 1.98 2.46 10,240
7. Belgium 2.92 2.21 2.57 10,890
8. West Germany 2.72 2.47 2.60 11,730
9. Denmark 3.20 2.45 2.83 11,900
Source: Euro-Barometer Survey number 16; for sampling information, see
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Figure 4. Support for Nationalization of Industry, and for Developing Nuclear 
Power, among Electorates of West European political parties, 1979. Parties 
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Figure 5. Support for Further Nationalization of Industry, and for 




























































































and one of the highest rates of taxation in the world. Over half 
of the Gross National Product is spent by the government. In 
Denmark, further redistribution by the government seems,far less 
urgent than in Greece— and the costs of government intervention 
impinge on a very large share of the population. The incentives 
to press still farther with the traditional economic policies of 
the Left are relatively weak, and public resistance relatively 
strong.
Figure 4 shows how the electorates of specific political 
parties stand on the two issue dimensions; Figure 5 gives the 
same information for the candidates of these parties. Rather 
than give a composite score based on combined results for several 
issues, we have selected two specific issues that convey the 
overall picture through a concrete illustration. We have chosen 
the respective groups' attitudes toward further nationalization 
of industry as an example of the classic economic issues; and 
attitudes toward developing nuclear power, as an example of the 
new non-economic issues. A given party's aggregate stand on each 
of these issues is very strongly correlated with its stand on the 
other issues having high loadings on the same dimension. At the 
elite level, for example, we find a mean correlation of .76 
between a given party's positions on nationalization of industry, 
government regulation, and redistribution of income. Similarly, 
there is a mean correlation of .84 between a given party's 
positions on nuclear power, defense and measures against 




























































































there is a mean correlation of only .16 between the two sets of 
issues.
(Figures 4 and 5 about here)
Accordingly, Figure 4 nor Figure 5 shows anything resembling 
a compact grouping of the parties along a Left-Right regression 
line (which would, theoretically, run from the upper Left corner 
to the lower Right corner of each figure). Quite the contrary, 
Figure 4 shows a scattering of party positions that is almost 
evenly distributed over the four quadrants. There is some 
tendency for the parties to be concentrated in the upper-Left and 
lower-Right quadrants, but to describe this pattern in terms of a 
unidimensional Left-Right polarization would be a grotesque 
oversimplication. Turning to the elite level, Figure 5 comes 
somewhat closer to unidimensionality, for the lower Left hand 
quadrant is almost empty: among candidates to the European 
Parliament, it is unusual to favor more nationalization of 
industry and the development of nuclear power; but two of 
Europe's largest parties fall into that category, with the French 
Communists constituting an extreme deviation, and the overall 
pattern is far from unidimensional.
A word of explanation is in order concerning the Belgian 
parties. Antagonism between the Flemish-speaking and French- 
speaking (or Walloon) segments of the population has led to the 
emergence of Flemish and Walloon nationalist parties, generally 
of relatively modest size but with deep historical roots. Since 
the late 1960's, ethnic cleavages have become more pronounced, 




























































































Flemish and Walloon sections that are now only loosely allied.
The parties are labeled accordingly. The Flemish and Walloon 
sections of the respective parties take quite similar positions 
on the two dimensions dealt with here. They are divided by 
ethnic factors that constitute a distinct and independent 
dimension of political cleavage.
The only avowedly extreme-Right party with substantial 
numbers of voters— the Italian neo-Fascist party (MSI)— does not 
occupy the extreme lower right hand corner of either Figure. 
CLearly, it is located on the Right; but most of the European 
liberal parties are more conservative than it, on at least one of 
the two dimensions. Nevertheless, it does hold an extreme 
position in another sense: its electorate shows the highest
level of political dissatisfaction among any of these parties, 
and one of the highest levels of support for revolutionary 
change.
Figure 4 demonstrates some interesting cross-national 
contrasts. As one would expect, the range of policy alternatives 
tends to be far greater in those countries having undiluted 
proportional representation, and a large number of parties. In 
particular, the Danish, Dutch and Italian parties show a 
relatively extreme dispersion in space, offering radically 
different ideological positions. By contrast, the leading 
parties of both Britain and Germany are concentrated in a compact 
area, as would be expected of relatively large, catch-all 
parties. But there is a significant contrast between these two 




























































































identical stand on the economic issue, and differ mainly on the 
non-economic issue; while with the British parties, it is exactly 
the other way around. The German public polarizes over the New 
Politics; the British public still polarizes along class lines-- 
and accordingly, it shows much higher class-voting indices than 
the Germans.
Figure 5 shows far greater dispersion than Figure 4: in
other words, the politicians of given parties take more extreme 
ideological positions than their electorates— confirming similar 
findings by previous investigators (Converse, 1975). Figures 4 
and 5 are presented in a way that actually understates the degree 
to which this is true. For the locations of the various 
electorates cluster relatively near the center of the issue 
space; in attitudes toward nuclear power, no electorate shows an 
aggregate score higher than approximately 3.75 or lower than 
1.50. Consequently, in order to depict the parties' relative 
positions, we have eliminated the outer margins and enlarged the 
central area of Figure 4. Figure 5, on the other hand, depicts 
the entire possible issue space. The candidates of some parties 
are unanimously "strongly for" or "strongly against" given 
issues; some parties (the German Ecologists or the Danish 
Democratic Center, for example) unanimously take the most extreme 
possible position on both issues. The candidates of four 
different parties (three of them liberal parties) fall at the 
same point on the right-hand border of Figure 5. The attainment 
of these extreme scores is facilitated by the fact that some of 




























































































but even some of the large parties, represented in our sample by 
many candidates, fall very near the extremes on one dimension or 
another: for example, the French Communists and Gaullists; the
British Conservatives; and the Italian Christian Democrats.
Thus, while the electorates of the principal British parties are 
concentrated in a very small portion of the total issue space, 
the candidates of these parties are separated by relatively large 
distances. The split that later took place in Britain's Labour 
Party, whereby the party elite lost the support of much of their 
electorate, seems to be foreshadowed by these data —  for the 
elites take a position far to the Left of their electorate.
While Conservative Party elites are located to the Right of their 
electorate, the distance is considerably smaller. By this 
standard the British Liberal Party would also appear to be in 
some danger— for its candidates are also located relatively far 
from their electorate.
On the whole, however, there is a close relationship between 
the issue positions of the electorate and elites of a given 
party. Table 4 gives the precise figures. Once again, we find 
that the most sensitive indicators of the two dimensions play a 
key role. The four strongest mass-elite correlations are found 
in connection with the two highest-loading issues on the economic 
Left-Right dimension shown in Table 1, and the two highest- 
loading issues on the non-economic issues dimension.
(Table 4 about here)
These issue correlations are handsome indeed. To interpret 




























































































CORRELATION BETWEEN ISSUE POSITIONS OF CANDIDATES OF GIVEN PARTY 
AND POSITION TAKEN BY ELECTORATE OF THAT PARTY
Source: Data set constructed using party as unit of analysis, based
on aggregated responses of the given party’s electorate (measured by 
reported voting intention) and aggregated responses of the given 
party's candidates to the European Parliament. Public was surveyed 
in April, 1979 (Euro-Barometer 11) and candidates were surveyed in 
March-May, 1979.
Develop nuclear power
Stronger measures against terrorists
More government management of economy




Protection of individual rights 
Abortion should be available 
Reduce income inequality 
Anti-Pollution measures 










































































































correlations that might conceivably be attributed to some 
methodological artifact such as response set. The correlations 
are based on two completely independent data sets, based on 
measurements at two different levels of the political system. 
Through they are aggregated to the group level (which tends to 
reduce the measurement error perennially present in survey data) 
the correlations found with our best indicators of the two 
dimensions are impressive. The .645 correlation between mass 
and elite attitudes toward nuclear power, for example, could be 
interpreted as meaning that nearly 42 per cent of the variance in 
the party elite's stand on this issue can be attributed to 
constituency influences. In fact, we do not believe that the 
causal linkage is that simple; part of it may represent the 
elites’ influence on their electorate, for example; or the 
electorate may support given parties because of the stand they 
take on key issues, without influencing their issue positions. 
Furthermore, the linkages may be based on cues concerning the two 
broader issue dimensions, rather than the specific indicators.
We will not attempt to determine the specific causal 
connections that are involved here. For present purposes, our 
point is simply that strong linkages do exist between the 
positions that the electorates and candidates of given parties 
take on these issues. It is virtually inconceivable that this 
pattern could be due to chance alone. Either the politicians of 
given parties are influencing their electorates, or the 
electorates are influencing the candidates’ positions on these 




























































































given parties, partly as a function of their stand on these 
issues; or candidates with appropriate views are more apt to be 
recruited. Each of these factors probably plays a role— and all 
but the first one implies that public preferences have an impact 
on elite-level politics. The net result is a surprisingly close 
fit between the positions of the electorates and politicians of 
given parties, on these issues.
The two most sensitive indicators of the New Politics 
dimension and the two most sensitive indicators of the 
economically based Left-Right dimension, are the issues that show 
the strongest elite-mass linkages. But the New Politics issues 
show even stronger linkages than do the economic issues.
Although West European political elites still tend to describe 
Left-Right political polarization primarily in terms of the 
classic issues of state ownership and control of the means of 
production, it appears that the electorates select their party 
more on the basis of the new issues than the old. Issue 
preferences explain only part of the variance in political party 
choice, of course; an even larger proportion may be due to long­
term party affiliations and loyalties. But insofar as issues do 
influence party preferences, the new issues seem to have at least 
as much impact as the old.
We hypothesized that the new non-economic issues dimension 
reflects a Materialist versus Post-Materialist cleavage, rather 
than the social class and religious cleavages that gave rise to 





























































































Table 5 shows the strength of the relationship between the 
issue positions taken by the candidates of given parties, and the 
aggregate characteristics of the electorates of these parties. 
Again, these are not intra-cranial correlations. They reflect 
elite-mass linkages, based on independent measurements at each 
level; and the characteristics of the electorates were measured 
prior to measurement of the elite issue positions. Since the 
characteristics examined here tend to be relatively enduring 
features of given electorates, there are plausible grounds for 
inferring that they have a causal impact on elite attitudes (or 
lead to selective recruitment of the candidates).
The top half of Table 5 deals with three key economic 
issues. It demonstrates that, among the three types of 
characteristics examined here, religiosity has the greatest 
impact. Not only has the religious factor been assimilated to 
the conventional Left-Right dimension— it actually outweighs 
social class as an influence on attitudes toward economic issues. 
The finding that religion outweighs social class in its electoral 
impact in most Western nations, seemed surprising in the context 
of prevailing social theory. The fact that religion outweighs 
social class in its impact on attitudes toward specifically 
economic issues, may seem more surprising still. Materialist/ 
Post-Materialist values also seem to have a significant impact on 
these attitudes, but their impact is clearly weaker than that of 
religiosity, and much weaker than the socio-religious variables 
combined.




























































































CORRELATION BETWEEN POLICIES SUPPORTED BY CANDIDATES OF A GIVEN PARTY 














Percentage of Manual workers 
among electorate .325 .224 .120 .223
Church attendance rate 
among electorate .460 .621 .480 .520
Ratio of Materialists to 
Post-Materialists among 











Percentage of manual workers 
among electorate 
Church attendance rate
-.017 -.077 + .086 -.003
among electorate 
Ratio of Materialists to
-.554 -.414 -.448 -.472
Post-Materialists among 
electorate .677 .512 .670 .620
k
Data on electorates based on cumulative results of Euro-Barometers 3-12; Candidates' positions 





























































































CORRELATES OF ISSUE POSITIONS TAKEN 
BY CANDIDATES OF S IXTY-S IX  PARTIES 





Proportion of Manual 









Ratio of Materialists 




SOCIAL CLASS RELIGION VALUES
Source1 Issue Battery Included in Survey of 7 4 2  Candidates to European 
Parliment Interviewed in Spring,1979 (See Inglehort et OI..1980); and Data 




























































































At the individual level, Materialist/Post-Materialist values 
have an ambivalent relationship to the issues linked with the 
conventional economic Left-Right dimension. Post-Materialist 
respondents are only slightly more favorable to redistribution of 
income than are Materialists— though the former are markedly more 
favorable to increasing economic aid to Third World countries. 
This may be because the two groups favor income redistribution 
for different reasons. Despite their relatively high income 
levels, Post-Materialists may favor redistriburion for the sake 
of human solidarity; on the other hand, lower-income Materialists 
may favor income redistribution because (to some extent) they are 
the ones who benefit from it. The situation is less ambiguous 
with regard to aid to Third World countries: here, neither group
stands to gain material benefits— and the Post-Materialists are 
much more favorable than the Materialists.
In keeping with their general tendency to support the 
positions of the Left, Post-Materialists are somewhat likelier to 
favor nationalization of industry than are Materialists. But 
Post-Materialists are slightly less likely to favor a greater 
government role in managing the economy. For the old Left, 
government ownership, regulation and control of the economy were 
inherently good; almost by definition, a larger government role 
was desirable, in almost any situation. FOr the Post- 
Materialists Left, big government is inherently dangerous. Like 
any large, hierarchical bureaucratic organization, it tends to 




























































































This fact poses a dilemma for the Post-Materialist Left.
They tend to favor social change; and almost any program of 
social change presupposes that the government, necessarily, will 
be the instrument to bring it about. But the Post-Materialist 
Left— far more than the traditional Left— regards the state as a 
potential instrument of oppression and exploitation. Though they 
favor equality, they are somewhat reluctant to use the state to 
bring it about. One way out of this dilemma (conceivably) might 
be through decentralizing the state. Hence, Post-Materialists 
strongly tend to favor regional autonomy; in the November 1981 
Euro-Barometer surveys, 36 per cent of the Materialists were 
"strongly for" greater regional autonomy, as compared with 51% of 
the Post-Materialists in the ten-nation European Community. Big 
government may be necessary to social change, but the Post- 
Materialist Left is ambivalent toward it.
On the other hand, the relationship between Materialist/ 
Post-Materialist values and the non-economic issues loading on 
the second dimension, is clear and unequivocal; Materialists are 
more than twice as likely to favor a stronger defense effort as 
are Post-Materialists; and almost twice as likely to favor 
developing nuclear power, or taking stronger measures against 
terrorism. The differences between Materialists and Post- 
Materialists on these issues are large and consistent, both from 
issue to issue and from nation to nation.
When we turn to the lower half of Table 5, we find 
indications that these preferences have a political impact. 




























































































Post-Materialists among the electorate is the strongest predictor 
of candidate attitudes toward the non-economic issues. The value 
preferences of the electorate easily outweigh the impact of both 
the religious and social class indicators combined, partly, 
because the latter effect is negligible— the linkage between the 
social class composition of a party's electorate and their 
candidate's stand on non-economic issues, is about as close to 
zero as one can get. Our religious indicator, on the other hand, 
does seem to have a significant impact.
The persistence of an apparently flourishing linkage between 
religious affiliations and political cleavages, coupled with a 
truly remarkable decline of social class cleavages, may seem 
paradoxical. But it is very much in keeping with the theoretical 
framework underlying this analysis. For reasons that we have 
discussed earlier in some detail (Inglehart, 1977: 217-222), the 
rise of Post-Materialist politics has an inherent tendency to 
neutralize class-based political cleavages, but it does not have 
that impact on religious cleavages; on the contrary, it may even 
give them new life. For Post-Materialists tend to be recruited 
from the more affluent strata that traditionally supported the 
Right, but they themselves tend to support the Left (and may 
engender a working class reaction that moves toward the Right).
In other words, Post-Materialism tends to reverse the polarity of 
the correlation between social class and the Left-Right 
dimension. But it does not have this impact on religion: Post-
Materialists tend to be recruited from the non-practicing segment 




























































































Left, and continues to do so. Furthermore, Post-Materialist 
support for cultural change may stimulate a conservative reaction 
on the part of those holding traditional religious values-- 
reinforcing, rather than weakening, their alignment with the 
Right. The rise of a new kind of value-based politics may give 
new relevance to much older value-based cleavages, rooted in the 
pre-industrial era (Pappi, 1977).
4. Group Polarization and Party Alignments.
We hypothesize that a process of intergenerational value 
change has led to the emergence of a new basis of support for 
political change— but that its impact on electoral behavior is 
retarded by the inertia of established party loyalties and group 
affiliations.
In order to test this hypothesis, we need to distinguish 
between the traditional socioeconomic Left-Right dimension, and 
support or opposition to the established order. It is not an 
easy task, for the two tend to be lumped together: the term 
"Left" connotes support for sociopolitical change and support for 
specific political parties. Just how closely the two actually 
are linked is an empirical question, and probably varies within a 
given population. Among the ideologically sensitive, support or 
opposition to the established order may be an important component 
of one's orientation toward Left and Right. Among those who are 
ideologically less aware, support for the "Left" or "Right" may 
be largely a matter of group affiliations and partisan loyalties, 
with little reference to support or opposition to types of 




























































































The labels "Left" and "Right" have been a staple part of 
political discourse for many decades, particularly in Europe. To 
some extent, support for a party of the "Left" undoubtedly does 
reflect an ideology of opposition to the existing sociopolitical 
order, which is what interests us at present. But insofar as the 
Left-Right labels are contaminated by a party identification 
component, they would not necessarily reflect one's attitude 
toward social change. We must try to distinguish between these 
two components of the excessively broad and all-inclusive Left- 
Right dimension, one based on long-term partisan loyalties and 
the other on one’s attitude toward social change.
One’s rating of the key groups that are active in 
contemporary politics should provide a means of making this 
distinction. For evidence on this score, let us turn to data 
from an eight-nation study of political action, fieldwork for 
which was carried out in 1974-1976 (for details, see Barnes,
Kaase et al., 1979). Each person interviewed in the eight 
national samples was asked to indicate how friendly or unfriendly 
his feelings were toward various groups in his society, using a 
"feeling thermometer" that ranged from a score of zero 
(indicating extremely cold feelings) to 100 (extremely friendly 
feelings). Our objective was to develop indices of each 
respondent's position for or against the groups shown in Table 6. 
In doing so, an important concern was to remove a general 
"response-set" tendency from the thermometer ratings— that is, a 
pronounced tendency for some individuals to give all groups 




























































































(Table 6 about here)
To remove this "response-set" tendency the average rating 
across all groups was computed for each respondent. This mean 
score was then subtracted from the thermometer rating of each 
group. Thus, for each respondent some groups are evaluated 
negatively (below the respondent's average) while other groups 
are valued positively. These adjusted thermometer ratings were 
then used in constructing factor score indices. Factor analysis 
of these ratings revealed a consistent pattern, with two basic 
dimensions underlying responses in each of the eight nations 
studied. As Table 6 indicates, we find a Left-Right partisanship 
factor in each country, based on ratings of the most important 
conservative party in that nation, as well as the rating of the 
most important party on the Left side of the political spectrum. 
The specific parties rated, in each respective country, were as 
follows:
Main Left Party Main Right Party
Britain Labour Party Conservative
Germany Social Democratic E&rty Christian Democratic Party
The Netherlands Labour Party Liberal Party
Austria Socialist Party People's Party (former
Christian Social)
United States Democratic Party Republican Party
Italy Communist Party Christian Democratic Party
Switzerland Socialist Party Radical Party
Finland Social Democratic Party National Coalition Party
Ratings of key institutions linked with the respective parties 
also have significant loadings on this factor, which 
simultaneously taps one’s partisan loyalties and one's sympathies 
in the long-standing opposition between labor and management.
In those countries with major Christian Democratic parties, 
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part of the cluster containing management and the most important 
political party of the Right. This holds true for The 
Netherlands, even though the "Right" party actually rated by the 
Dutch respondents was not church-related (they rated the Liberals 
instead). It does not hold true in Switzerland, though that 
country does have important church-linked parties. But this is 
not the only anomaly in the way group sympathies polarize in 
Switzerland: the dimension based on opposition between Left and 
Right, labor and management, that we find almost everywhere else, 
is strangely deformed in Switzerland. For one thing, the major 
Left party does not load on this factor. Though this is indeed 
anomalous, it seems to reflect the reality of Swiss politics 
quite accurately. For more than a generation, Switzerland has 
been governed by a cartel of the four major parties, with the 
Socialists part of a virtually permanent coalition that also 
includes the three major parties of the Right. If mass 
sympathies do not polarize between the Socialists and Radicals, 
it may be because the parties themselves do not polarize in their 
behavior. In Switzerland, Left-Right polarization is reduced to 
a truncated opposition between the Radical party and the labor 
unions (with a minor contribution from the women's liberation 
movement).
The cleavages between labor and management, and between 
religious and secular publics, have been part of the political 
scene for many decades; they seem to have been incorporated into 
the traditonal Left-Right (or liberal-conservative) dimension 




























































































with one set of groups or another in a predictable and by now 
institutionalized pattern.
But new issues and new groups have become politically 
salient in recent years. One's reaction to these groups forms 
the basis of a second major dimension of sociopolitical cleavage. 
One tends to sympathize with the women's liberation movement, 
student protestors, foreign workers and revolutionary groups on 
one hand; or with the police, civil servants and other elements 
of the established social order (including the clergy, in those 
countries where the church does not have formal ties with the 
dominant parties of the Right). One's position on this dimension 
is largely unrelated to one's partisan loyalties. The two 
dimensions seem to reflect: (1) the traditional socioeconomic
Left-Right cleavage, with an infrastructure based on the 
polarization between labor and management (with religious 
cleavages also assimilated to this dimension, in some countries), 
and (2) an Establishment/Anti-Establishment (or New Politics) 
dimension, based on one's reaction to groups that have become 
politically prominent much more recently than organized labor-- 
and, we suspect, are more active carriers of support for social 
change.
While the pattern is remarkably consistent cross-nationally, 
Italy's configuration is unique. One one hand, the polarization 
between the Communist and Christian Democratic parties appears 
not only on the Left-Right partisan dimension, but also on the 
Establishment/Anti-Establishment dimension. In contrast with 




























































































party polarization), in Italy both dimensions reflect 
polarization according to party preference. While in 
Switzerland, the Left has permanently shared power, in Italy the 
main party of the Left (the Italian Communist Party) had been 
permanently excluded from power, with the Christian Democrats 
continuously in office from the end of World War II up to the 
time of our survey. Hence, in Italy, partisan conflict is not 
distinct from support for social change— on the contrary, 
partisan change may seem a prerequisite for any basic social 
change. Italy is unique, furthermore, in that attitudes toward 
the civil service are not linked with the Establishment/Anti- 
Establishment factor (as everywhere else) but with the Left-Right 
partisan factor. Here, the electorate reacts to the civil 
service as if it were linked with the Christian Democratic 
Party--again, a rather accurate reflection of political reality 
(in this case, the colonization of the civil service).
The Establishment/Anti-Establishment factor shows a 
distinctive feature in one other country as well: The
Netherlands. In addition to a perfectly normal polarization on 
the Left-Right partisanship dimension, both labor unions and big 
business show significant loadings on the Establishment/Anti- 
Establishment dimension— and here they share the same polarity: 
both are seen as Establishment groups. This may reflect The 
Netherlands’ highly developed system of corporatist involvement 
of both labor and management organizations in the shaping of 




























































































sympathies in The Netherlands conforms to the pattern that 
prevails generally among these eight nations.
In six of the eight nations, political polarization 
corresponds to our expectations very closely: we find a Left-
Right partisanship dimension, intimately linked with one's 
attitudes toward labor and management (and the Church, in those 
countries where the church has traditionally played a major 
role). Alongside this dimension, an independent second dimension 
taps support for radical and non-Establishment groups— or for the 
established authorities. In two countries, the structure of 
group sympathies deviates from the general pattern— in 
Switzerland, through an absence of partisan polarization; and in 
Italy, because party polarization is everywhere.
The two dimensions in Table 6 are uncorrelated, since we 
have used varimax rotation in factor-analyzing the group sympathy 
ratings. This technique enables us to separate a theoretically 
new and independent axis of polarization from the effects of 
political party loyalties that would otherwise be superimposed 
upon it. Let us now examine the empirical relationship between 
these two dimensions and one's political party preferences, 
propensities for political action, and social background 
characteristics. In doing so, we should bear in mind that, 
while the two dimensions of Table 6 are deliberately constrained 
to be uncorrelated, the variables introduced in subsequent 
analyses are not. Thus, as Table 7 illustrates, across the eight 
nations, both one's political party identification and one's vote 




























































































factor score on the Left-Right group sympathies dimension. This 
is certainly not surprising. But these variables also show 
significant correlations with Establishment/Anti-Establishment 
sympathies. Those who vote for the Left tend to have anti- 
Establishment sympathies, but the linkage is modest. It becomes 
significantly stronger, however, when we move from direct 
indicators of political party ties to a more issue-related 
variable: Left-Right self-placement.
(Table 7 about here)
Self-placement on the Left-Right ideological scale, we 
argued, reflects a mixture of party loyalties and ideological 
position, with the former predominating. The data in Table 7 
tend to support this interpretation. For Left-Right self­
placement has a far stronger linkage with the first (party- 
related) dimension than with the second--which, we argued, is the 
more sensitive indicator of current support for social change.
But because Left-Right self-placement does tend to reflect 
current issues, its linkage with the second dimension is stronger 
than that found with either of the party-based variables. Table 
7 also confirms the interpretation that the second dimension i_s 
the better indicator of support for change. For it includes 
results from a Protest Potential scale, based on approval of an 
escalating series of protest actions, and on reports of actual 
behavior (for a detailed description see Barnes, Kaase et al., 
1979: pp. 65-B1). While our Protest Potential Scale shows 
significant correlations with both dimensions, its linkage with




























































































stronger of the two. Contemporary political protest seems much 
less likely to spring from a pro-labor stance than from alignment 
with other non-establishment groups.
Table 8 summarizes the overall relationship between our two 
group-sympathy dimensions and three types of social background 
variables that tap industrial, pre-industrial and post-industrial 
cleavages respectively. The results show an almost perfect 
parallel to the pattern we found in Table 5 above. Like the 
economic issues dimension, the conventional Left-Right group 
sympathies dimension reflects the religious variable above all, 
with our indicators of value priorities and social class each 
making lesser but significant contributions to one's sense of 
group alignment. And like the non-economic issues dimension, 
one's position on the Establishment/Anti-establishment dimension 
reflects the respondent's value priorities far more than either 
of the other two variables (and more than both of them combined); 
religion has an appreciable impact here (as in Table 5), but the 
role of social class drops to an almost negligible level — again, 
in parallel with what happens with the New Politics issue 
dimension. Insofar as there _i_s any linkage, the lower economic 
strata tend to side with the Establishment groups— a reversal of 
the polarity that is taken for granted in class-based models of 
political protest. Is the Establishment/Anti-Establishment group 
sympathies dimension an aspect of the New Politics, as seems to 
be true of the non-economic issues dimension analyzed above? We 
believe it is; and if that is the case, then it (like the new 




























































































CORRELATES OF THE LEFT-RIGHT GROUP SYMPATHIES DIMENSION AND THE 
ESTABLISHMENT/ANTI-ESTABLISHMENT DIMENSION







Political Party Identification .644 -.164
Vote in Last Election .598 -.152
Left-Right Self-Placement .465 -.238





























































































SOCIAL BACKGROUND CORRELATES OF THE LEFT-RIGHT GROUP SYMPATHIES 
DIMENSION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT/ANTI-ESTABLISHMENT DIMENSION 






Church attendance -.225 .145
Occupational prestige, head of 
household .145 .061



























































































political behavior of the younger age cohorts than of older 
groups, whose political outlook was formed in an era of 
pronounced social class conflict. Let us examine the evidence.
(Table 9 about here)
Table 9 shows the correlations between our three social 
background characteristics, and voting behavior among the 12,588 
respondents interviewed in the representative cross-sections of 
the publics of the eight nations included in the Political Action 
study. The figures given here represent the mean correlations 
obtained for each of three age groups in each of the eight 
nations. The pattern varies from country to country; relatively 
small differences between age groups were found in Great Britain, 
where class voting persists to a relatively great degree even 
among younger respondents— a finding in keeping with the fact 
that Britain has experienced relatively slow economic growth 
during recent decades, and shows relatively little evidence of 
intergenerational value change. (For a more detailed discussion 
of these cross-national findings, see Inglehart, forthcoming). 
Nevertheless for the eight nations as a whole, the social 
background variables show three contrasting patterns. In keeping 
with Hypothesis 8, social class (as indicated by the 
occupational prestige rating of the head of household) has much 
more impact on voting among the oldest age group than among the 
youngest. Conversely, Materialist/Post-Materialist values seem 
to be a much stronger influence on the voting behavior of the 
young than on that of the old. Finally, the religious factor 




























































































CORRELATES OF VOTE IN LAST ELECTION BY AGE GROUP 
(Mean product-moment correlation for eight national samples)
AGES
16-39 40-59 60+
Materialist/Post-Materialist Values -.21 -.15 -.14
Church attendance -.30 -.28 -.30
Occupational Prestige .13 .20 .26




























































































Only time series data can demonstrate the point directly, 
but here again the evidence points to the conclusion that social 
class voting tends to decline as the impact of the Materialist/ 
Post-Materialist cleavage grows stronger; and that the latter 
process has little effect on religious voting.
5. The Impact of Social Cleavages on Three 
Types of Political Polarization.
We hypothesized that the impact of Post-Materialism would be 
greatest on those forms of political polarization that are least 
strongly linked with established political party loyalties.
Thus, we would expect its impact to be weakest on voting 
behavior— a relatively direct expression of party loyalties; and 
relatively strong on support for social change, a super-issue 
that has no explicit linkage with party ties. Conversely, if it 
is true that social class conflict was a more important factor a 
generation ago than it is today, it would be preserved most fully 
in those forms of polarization most directly linked with the 
pattern-preserving influence of long-term party loyalties: the
impact of social class on voting should be far stronger than its 
impact on support for social change. As a hybrid variable 
reflecting both a partisanship component and an ideological 
component that sums up one's position on current issues, Left- 
Right self-placement should occupy an intermediate position 
between voting and support for social change.
As the first step in testing this hypothesis, let us examine 
the absolute impact of social class, religion and individual 




























































































Table 10 shows how each of the three social cleavages relate 
to voting patterns, in a pooled sample based on the Euro- 
Barometer surveys carried out in the middle and late 1970s, 
weighted according to population. This sample, of course, fails 
to convey the wealth of variation in the social background 
characteristics of the scores of parties in nine different 
countries. It groups parties together into two broad 
categories— the "Left" (the various Communist, Socialist, and 
Social Democratic parties); and the "Right" (the various 
Christian Democratic Conservative and some other parties). A 
minority (about 9 per cent of those reporting a party preference) 
are not classified: the centrist and ethnic nationalist parties, 
are excluded, for example, and the Liberal parties are split 
between some that seem clearly part of the Right, and others that 
are considered Centrist, and excluded from these tables.
Detailed information on how each party is coded appears in the 
ICPSR codebooks for the Euro-Barometer surveys.
Though it fails to convey a vast number of interesting 
details, this massive pooled sample does provide an exceptionally 
reliable data base for analysis of overall patterns of political 
polarization in Western Europe.
(Table 10 about here)
As Table 10 reveals, class voting was still fairly strong in 
Western Europe in the late 1970's: the Alford Class Voting Index
was +18 for the European Community as a whole. While this is 
well below the levels reported for most West European countries 




























































































ELECTORAL CLEAVAGES BASED ON SOCIAL CLASS, RELIGION AND 
PERSONAL VALUES IN WESTERN EUROPE 
(Percentage Voting for Parties of the Left, 1973-1979)
% Voting 
for Left N
1. Social Class Voting
Respondents from families headed by manual 
worker 63% (21,616)
Respondents from families with head having 
non-manual occupation 45 (24,594)
Alford class-voting index +18
2. Religious Voting
Respondent attends church at least once a week\at leasts





Respondent never attends church 65 (10,174)
3. Value-based Voting
Respondent has Materialist priorities 43 (16,777)
Respondent has Mixed priorities 53 (23,180)
Respondent has Post-Materialist priorities 71 (4,678)
Based on pooled results from each of the nine-nation European Community 
surveys carried out from 1973 through 1979 (Euro-Barometers 3, 4, 5, 6,




























































































cleavages in Western Europe. It is clear from Table 10 that 
religious cleavages are also very strong. Since there is some 
ambiguity about just where to draw the cutting line with church 
attendance, we will not attempt to construct an index analogous 
to the Alford Index, but will compare the relative strengths of 
the respective cleavages through a Multiple Classification 
Analysis, below. Finally, Table 10 indicates that the voting 
behavior of the various value types is quite distinctive; indeed, 
if we were to simply compare the voting intentions of the pure 
Materialist type (based on the original four-item values index), 
we would obtain a larger percentage difference than that found 
with social class. But our values indicator is not dichotomous: 
over half of those reporting a preference for parties grouped 
with the Left or the Right, fall into the mixed values type; 
while the Post-Materialist type shows quite distinctive voting 
behavior, the sheer percentage differences would convey an 
exaggerated impression of the impact of values on voting 
behavior. Multiple Classification Analysis alleviates this 
problem, by calculating coefficients that are weighted according 
to the number of cases in each category of the independent 
variables.
Table 11 shows the percentage differences associated with 
self-placement on the Left-Right scale. While the differences 
linked with church attendance and value type remain quite large, 





























































































LEFT-RIGHT SELF-PLACEMENT, ACCORDING TO SOCIAL CLASS,
RELIGIOUS PRACTICE AND PERSONAL VALUES
(Percentage placing selves on Left half [codes 1-5] 
of Left-Right scale, 1973-1979)
% Placing Selves N_ 
____on Left_____
1, By Social Class
Manual head of family 61% (23,498)
Non-manual head of family 53 (29,459)
2, By religious Practice
Respondent attends church at least once a week 42
Respondent attends church a few times a year 52







































































































SUPPORT FOR SOCIAL CHANGE, BY SOCIAL CLASS, RELIGIOUS 









1. By Social Class
Manual 8% 62% 30% 100% (17,579)
Non-manual 7 64 29 100 (24,025)
2. By Religious Practice
Attends church at 
least weekly 4 60 36 100 (9,865)
Attends church a few 
times a year 5 60 35 100 (16,473)
Never attends church 9 61 30 100 (7,981)
3. By Value Priorities
Materialist 4 57 38 99 (18,292)
Mixed 8 62 30 100 (26,694)
Post-Materialist 17 69 14 100 (6,098)
*Based on pooled results from Euro-Barometers 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 




























































































(Tables 11 and 12 about here)
Finally, Table 12 shows the relationship of social class, 
church attendance and value type, with support for social change. 
With all three independent variables, a Reformist majority 
prevails. But even a cursory inspection of this table suggests 
that one's values are the dominant factor. There is virtually no 
difference whatever in the degree to which manual and non-manual 
respondents support social change: the former group is one point
more likely to favor revolutionary change, but it is also one 
point more likely to favor defense of the present society. 
Religion, on the other hand, does seem to have an appreciable 
impact on this orientation: those who never attend church are
about twice as likely to support revolutionary change as those 
who attend church weekly; and somewhat less likely to favor 
defense of the established social order. But the differences 
associated with value type are substantially greater. Post- 
Materialists are four times as likely to favor revolutionary 
change as are Materialists; and a great deal less likely to favor 
defending the present society.
(Table 13 about here)
Now let us compare the impact of the three social background 
variables on each of the three types of political polarization. 
Table 14 gives the results of a Multiple Classification Analysis 
based on these data. The Eta coefficients show the relative 
strength of each predictor variable, weighted for the number of 
cases in each category; while the Beta coefficients provide a 
































































































Church attendance .264 .242
Social class .179 .162
Value priorities .141 .126
2. Left-Right Self-Placement
Church attendance .201 .195
Value priorities .188 .179
Social class .095 .084
3. Support for Social Change
Value priorities .185 .172
Church attendance .111 .094
Social class .032 .020
Source: Pooled data from European Community surveys carried out 1973-1979



























































































other two predictor variables. The relative strength of the Beta 
coefficients is shown in graphic form in Figure 6.
(Figure 6 about here)
As we hypothesized, the net impact of social class on 
voting behavior outweighs that of value type— though our 
religious indicator shows a stronger effect than either of them. 
But when we turn to support for social change, values are the 
strongest predictor by a wide margin; the impact of social class 
is negligible, while religous practice has a significant effect 
(though only about half as strong as that of values). Left-Right 
self placement shows a pattern consistent with our 
characterization of it as a hybrid of partisanship and 
ideological variables: religion has the strongest impact, 
followed by values and social class.
The pattern obtained here is by now familiar. As was true 
in connection with issue polarization and the two group 
sympathies dimensions, the evidence supports the interpretation 
that a new axis of political polarization has arisen in 
relatively recent years, and that it reflects an oppostion 
between Materialist and Post-Materialist goals. While political 
party loyalties remain tied to the social class-based axis, they 
tend to be out of phase with a New Politics cleavage.
6. Conclusion.
Building the welfare state and restoring economic growth 
were, understandably, the dominant political concerns of the 
1930's and the postwar era. In the late 1960's and 1970's, Post- 
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Figure 6. The Impact of Religion, Social Class and Values on three 
types of Political Polarization. Height of each bar is proportional 




























































































Left and of American Liberals. The effects of this coup have not 
yet been assimilated into either the rhetoric or the party 
alignments of Western nations.
Protest has become divorced from partisanship, to a 
remarkable degree. Two main axes of political polarization exist 
side by side, with the leading parties aligned along the familiar 
Left-Right axis based on religion and social class, in uneasy 
coexistence with a largely independent polarization between 
Materialists and Post-Materialists— who continue to dominate the 
issue arena. Since the first OPEC oil shock, in 1973, Western 
economies have functioned in an atmosphere of insecurity and 
diminishing expectations. But though everyone assumes that the 
issues of the 1980's will be economic issues, the ones that evoke 
political activism today are still largely Post-Materialist ones.
The rise of Post-Materialism has placed existing party 
alignments under chronic stress. For in most countries, these 
alignments do not correspond to either the social bases of 
support for change, or to polarization over the most heated 
issues.
The resulting stress can be resolved in various ways (1) 
Dealignment: there may be a gradual decline of party loyalty and
party identification, in so far as the most salient issues no 
longer provide an incentive that attaches new voters to existing 
parties; (2) Realignment: existing parties may split, or be
taken over by reorienting elites.
There is yet another possibility. The new axis of 




























































































decline in importance; or— more likely— it may be assimilated 
into a new synthesis.
A Materialist consensus provided the rationale and the 
legitimating myth of industrial society. Its Post-Materialist 
antithesis has not yet led to the emergence of a new synthesis. 
But it seems likely that the wave of the future is not undiluted 
acceptance of Post-Materialist goals. The Post-Materialists 
brought into the political arena a number of issues that had been 
largely ignored and neglected; in doing so, they help correct a 
course that tended to sacrifice the quality of life to one-sided 
economic considerations. But carried to an extreme, Post- 
Materialism can be equally self-defeating. The anti-industrial 
outlook of some of the movement's ideologues could lead to a 
neglect of the economic base on which Post-Materialism ultimately 
depends. In the long run, a new synthesis of Materialist and 
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